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THIS IS AN URGENT PLEA FOR FAXES TO BE SENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE UK
PRIME MINISTER PROTESTING THE DECISION TO GIVE CONDITIONAL APPROVAL FOR AN
EXPORT CREDIT FOR THE ILISU DAM IN TURKEY. IF YOU GET THIS AFTER THE NEW
YEAR< PLEASE STILL SEND IT.  IT WON'T BE TOO LATE.

THE DECISION HAS BEEN PUSHED THROUGH BY TONY
BLAIR, AGAINST OPPOSITION BY SEVERAL UK GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS. PROTEST
LETTERS WILL MAKE REAL DIFFERENCE - GIVING MORE INFLUENCE TO THOSE WITHIN
GOVERNMENT OPPOSED TO THE PROJECT. 

 FURTHER BACKGROUND
Construction on the 1200MW Ilisu dam, the largest planned hydroelectric project in Turkey, is due to start in 2000 and is expected to take 7-8 years. Located on the Tigris river in Turkish Kurdistan, 65km upstream from the Syrian and Iraqi borders, the $2 billion project is part of Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project (Turkish initials "GAP"). GAP is a $32 billion infrastructure development programme that envisages the construction of 22 dams and 19 power plants on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their tributaries. 
Originally planned as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, the project failed to find a bidder. Subsequently, the Turkish Ministry of Energy opted to go ahead on its own account, awarding the contract to a consortium led by Sulzer Hydro (Switzerland). Construction has been subcontracted to a further consortium made up of, among others, Balfour Beatty, Impregilo, Skanska and the Turkish companies, Nurol, Kiska and Tekfen. ABB Power Generation and Sulzer Hydro will supply the generating equipment. 
The Union Bank of Switzerland is arranging finance. Export credits and investment insurance guarantees are now being sought by the construction consortium from the export credit agencies (ECAs) of Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Coordinated by the Swiss Exportriskogarantie, the ECAs are presently negotiating a "common position" on Ilisu. Switzerland has already given its conditional approval for an ECA-backed guarantee of 470 million Swiss francs for the equipment to be supplied by ABB Power Generation and Sulzer Hydro. 
Balfour Beatty is seeking a £200 million export credit for the project from the UK Export Credits Guarantee Department. The UK Trade Secretary Stephen Byers announced on December 22nd 1999 that he was "minded" to provide conditional support for the credit. The dam is opposed, however, by the Foreign Office - and there are reliable reports that the export credit is being forced through by Prime Minister Tony Blair. 
The UK decsion comes despite two reports, commissioned by the government, which are damning of the project. They make it clear that local people are against the dam, that no consultation has taken place with them, that no resettlement plan exists, that serious doubts hang over compensation, and that major environmental impacts have yet to be addressed.

Some quotes give the critical flavour of the reports:

- "Host populations could not be interviewed as they have not yet been
identified by the resettlement coordinators. This is because the DSI [the
government department building the dam] has not prepared a detailed
resettlement plan."

- "No host areas have been identified for resettlement under the Ilisu
project. . . . This creates uncertainty among the affected people and it is
excludes [sic] the participation of host communities in the planning
process. One of the problems identified in previous resettlement projects
was integrating host and resettled communities."

- "Estimates of the number of people likely to be displaced by the Ilisu
Dam vary and the DSI have not yet produced definitive numbers."

- "Open consultative processes are not part of the institional culture or
political system."

- "The majority of stakeholders object to the dam. People are wary of th
social upheaval that lies ahead of them and some simply do not want to
leave their village roots."

- "Negative perceptions of the project have been exacerbated by weak
relationships between local stakeholders and institutions. Local
stakeholders believe that they have no forum to express their concerns over
adequate compensation for expropriated assets, decisions over new
settlement locations and loss of social and cultural capital."

- "How social capital can be protected or compensated has been neglected in
both the resettlement policy framework as well as the planning of the Ilisu
dam project."

- "Lack of consultation and mistrust of the DSI [the government agency
building the dam] alienates stakeholders from opting for government
assisted resettlement which has a better chance of preserving communities.
The majority take monetary compensation and self resettlement which is to
the advantage of vulnerable groups."

- "Land tenure and land title problems have not been addressed in
resettlement planning to date, despite the fact that the GAP Master plan of
1989 states that "the status of land ownership in the GAP region needs to
be reclassified urgently, and the Government should clarify future land
reform legislation to ensure secure land title."

- "Farming households preceive potential benefits from the project to be
closely linked wih the skewed land ownership patterns, with large holdings
benefiting."

- "Constraints on the gathering of data were the rapid nature of the field
and restricted access to some of the restricted area due to local security
issues."

- The reports also give a far higher figure for the numbers affected by the
project - almost three times that given by Balfour Beatty. "A large number
of villages will be affected necessitating the compulsory resettlement of
more than an estimated 16,000 people and affecting a further 20,000."

- The environmental report identifies three environmental impacts "which
may be significant and which are not adequately addressed by studies to
date." These include "possible downstream impacts",the "loss of endemic
riverine species", "environmental impacts from associated and secondary
developments."

- Doubts are raised over the institutional and financial capacity of the
Turkish authorities to manage the environmental risks for the project. The
environmental report recommends: "An institutional analysis to determine
whether this capacity exists or can be achieved . . . will therefore be an
integral and essential activity in preparing the . . . EMP [environmental
mitigation prrogamme]."

- There has been no consideration of alternatives. The environmental
reports stipulates that such an analysis should be a pre-condition for ECGD
support.

The DTI is currently discussing the reports with representatives of the
Turkish Government nd other Government export credit agencies. The Turkish
government is reported in the Financial Times to have rejected the reports
as "out-of-date" (they were written in August). However, a more recent,
independent studies by the Kurdish Human Rights Project (based on a field
trip in late Septemeber) has reinforecs the reports' findings.
 

The UK government is discussing with the Turkish government "the details of
the areas where changes would be required before the British government
could consider export credit support. These are, the need to:

- "draw up a resettleent programme which reflects internationally accepted
practice and includes independent monitoring;
- "make provision for upstream water treatment plants capabale of ensuring
that water qulity is maintained;"
- "give an assurance that adequate downstream water flows will be
maintained at all times; and
- "produce a detailed plan to preserve as much as possible of the
archeological heritage of Hasankefy as possible."

The two reports make recommendations that are far stronger than those
adopted by the government. For example:

- The social report considers it "essential" that
"consultation/participation with local stakeholders should be in place
BEFORE . . . the contract is signed." No mention is made of this in the
DTI's conditions

- The environmental report stipulates that alternatives should be studied :
 

Letter:
 
 

The Rt. Hon. Tony Blair,
10, Downing Street,
London W1

FAX: ( +44) 0171 925 0918 / 0171 930 9572

December 22nd 1999
 
 

Dear Prime Minister,

We are dismayed and deeply shocked by the announcement today that the government is "minded" to grant an export credit to Balfour Beatty for the Ilisu Dam in Turkey. The decision makes a mockery of the government's stated commitment to sustainable development and to an ethical foreign policy. 

The reports commissioned by the government to help ministers decide whether or not to back the scheme make it quite clear that the project falls far short of even the minimum standards expected of a project of this nature. They reveal, for example, that:
- Forced resettlement has already emptied some villages in the area;
- The "majority of local stakeholders object to the dam";
- The DSI has not prepared a detailed resettlement plan";
- - "No host areas have been identified for resettlement under the Ilisu project";
- "Estimates of the number of people likely to be displaced by the Ilisu Dam vary and the DSI have not yet produced definitive numbers."
- "Open consultative processes are not part of the institutional culture or political system";
- " Local stakeholders believe that they have no forum to express their concerns over adequate compensation for expropriated assets, decisions over new settlement locations and loss of social and cultural capital";
- "Lack of consultation and mistrust of the DSI alienates stakeholders from opting for government assisted resettlement which has a better chance of preserving communities"; 
- "Local stakeholders have been waiting for more than 20 years to be informed directly about resettlement, despite the fact that the project design was approved by the government in 1982";
- Data-gathering was constrained by "restricted access to some of the affected area due to local security issues."

The reports also make it clear that the Turkish Government has conspicuously failed to implement its own procedures on resettlement as outlined in the GAP Master plan of 1989; that there are serious doubts over the institutional capacity of the Turkish government to implement mitigatory environmental programmes; and that data-gathering is severely constrained by "restricted access to some of the affected area due to local security issues".  One may justifiably conclude that breaches of any agreed resettlement plan are highly likely and that independent monitoring of the project is an unrealistic prospect.

Your government  has simply ignored these findings and their clear implications. Instead, it has announced itself willing to proceed on the basis of "assurances" from the Turkish government, despite clear evidence - supported by judgments in the European Court of Human Rights - that such assurances are worth little. The government has not even required that a legally-binding agreement be reached on downstream water flows: yet, the consequences for peace in the region in the event of Turkey restricting the water flow of the Tigris are likely to be severe.
 

In giving its support for a project which so show so little regard for those most directly affected; which threatens to exacerbate conflict not only in the immediate area but more widely; and where the most basic pre-conditions for a successful development outcome are light years from being met, the UK government  reveals a  contempt for its own stated environment, development and foreign policies. To its shame, it has also become a willing accomplice is yet another assault on the rights of the Kurdish people. 

We urge you to reconsider the decision.

and that the institutional capacity of the Turkish authorities should be
analysed. No mention is made of either of these recommendations.